What Sun Tzu might have done if he was in Singapore politics instead

SINGAPORE – What do Tiong Bahru Group Representation Constituency (GRC), Cheng San GRC and Eunos GRC have in common? First and foremost, they were the scenes of closely contested electoral battles, which saw the opposition losing by thin margins. And, the three of them are now defunct, at least they are now part of the chapter within the annals of Singapore’s electoral history. The same goes for Braddell Heights, Anson and other Single Member Constituencies (SMC). It isn’t a big mystery that these constituencies are consolidated within a GRC helmed by a PAP minister.

And it goes without saying that the PAP were beneficiaries after their disappearance. Undoubtedly, the opposition was derailed by it. When boundaries shift, i.e. when an opposition stronghold is integrated with another PAP-supporting area, the odds of winning decreases significantly, more so if the GRC is helmed by a heavyweight minister. And this is further exacerbated by the fact that the election deposits keeps increasing all over the years. During the last General Elections, the election deposit for every candidate was a whopping $13500.

However, does the PAP always gets its way? The fact remains that an opposition stronghold is after all an opposition stronghold assuming the residents are not re-located. And this could end up being a minor shot in the PAP’s foot. Recall during the General Elections of 2006, expectations of Mr Lee Hsien Loong winning by a huge margin was high, at least from the PAP’s perpective because they were pitted against a team of newcomers from the Worker’s Party. There was even some talk of the newcomers losing their electoral deposits.

What the PAP couldn’t count on was the Cheng San bogeyman lying in wait at Ang Mo Kio GRC (Ang Mo Kio GRC absorbed Cheng San GRC). The results? Mr Lee turned in an average performance relative to his party mates, and couldn’t meet his expectation of “completely thrashing his opponents”. Arguably, the results at Ang Mo Kio could be attributed partly to the Cheng San effect. Of course, there were other factors that could have influenced the outcome too.

Thus, the billion dollar question before every election is how has the boundaries changed as compared to the last elections. And, it is understandably easy to get carried away with worrying about the boundary changes as the opposition candidates are likely to weigh their chances.

The changes are so unpredictable that it is futile attempting to predict the changes in boundaries. What can the opposition do about it? Nothing, and why they should even bother? The most basic, yet prudent move by the opposition will be to build on their influence around these stronghold areas, and this should start immediately after the current election in preparation for the next one. Thus, the opposition should be setting up “base camps” in such areas to consolidate their support and spread their influence, instead of worrying about the new boundaries. And if they manage to set up a massive sphere of influence, no amount of massive re-drawing is going to give the PAP any advantage.

And there are potential stronghold sites where the opposition can establish their “base camps”, all of which saw close fights in previous years. Cheng San, Eunos, Tiong Bahru, Anson, Braddell Heights, Aljunied, Changi, Fengshan, Paya Lebar, Bukit Batok and others have received 40% or more votes for the opposition. Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong are prime examples of candidates who successfully build their “base camps” in their stronghold, although it could be argued that the dynamics of competition in a GRC is far more complex than that of an SMC. That being said, there is no harm expanding the sphere of influence within a stronghold, no?

Although, the re-drawing of boundaries may technically disadvantage the opposition, this can be negated if the opposition adopts the appropriate strategy. Even Sun Tzu himself said:”The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.” And this position that Sun Tzu speaks about is the sphere of influence radiating from the opposition’s stronghold.